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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDNAL. KOPP, Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal \' 12999 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
In order to simplify the consideration of the Appel-
lant's discussion of the points raised in the Respondent's 
Brief, the points will be discussed by the Appellant in 
the order in which they are set out in that Brief, so far 
as practical. 
1 
POINT I 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATE OF 
THE RECORD. 
It is Respondent's contention that the Appellant 
is merely rearguing factual matters which were deter-
mined against Appellant by the lower court. This 
contention is unfounded. 'Vhat the Appellant does 
attack are the legal conclusions of the Commission 
and lower court which were drawn from the facts and 
it would contend that this Court is not bound by legal 
conclusions of the Industrial Commission or the lower 
court. Reference is made to a case cited on Page 7 of 
Respondent's Brief, Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 
F. 2d 259 ( 1970). Appellant would reiterate the quote 
from that case found on Page 8 of Respondent's Brief: 
"We are not, however, bound by evidence 
which has not reached the status of finding of 
fact, nor by conclusions which are legal infer-
ences from facts." 
The legal question of what constitutes the same 
job, job classifiication or position is what is in con-
tention and this is a legal rather than factual deter-
mination. 
Respondent contends that both the Industrial Com-
mission and the lower court found factually against the 
contention that there were two distinct and different 
jobs within the dispatch office. This is not true. In 
fact, it would appear that the lower court concluded, 
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as a legal conclusion, that because there was some over-
lapping of the functions performed this made them 
the same job. In fact, in its finding the lower court 
acknowledged that there were two jobs and stated: 
"Regardless of the distinct duties purportedly 
shown by Defendant, the evidence in our opinion, 
does not show that a male or female was speci-
fically assigned to one job to the exclusion of the 
other." (Industrial Record, page 298) (Empha-
sis added) 
It was the finding of the Industrial Commission that 
irrespective of the fact that there existed two distinct 
jobs within the dispatch office, because the Respondent 
was not specifically assigned to the one job to the 
exclusion of the other, this fact, no matter how little 
or how much she performed the tasks of the other job, 
required a finding that it was the same job. The lower 
court in a memorandum decision dated August 20, 1971, 
stated that it sustained the Order of the Industrial 
Commission. The court's finding of fact and conclusions 
of law state merely: 
"That the Plaintiff performed the same serv-
ices as male employees of Salt Lake City during 
the period in question in her job as dispatcher, 
but received as compensation a substantial lower 
amount than the male employees." (Trial Court 
Record, page 47) 
The lower court and the Industrial Commission made 
no finding as to what portion of time the Respondent 
performed the same services as did the male employees 
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and nowhere did they state that she performed these 
services to an equal extent with the male employees. 
It would also seem that Respondent attempts to 
argue from both sides of the fence when she puts forth 
the argument that the lower court and the Industrial 
Commission found that there was no distinction in the 
type of jobs performed by the Respondent and the 
m~ counterparts, and then turns around and argues 
that the Respondent had the most intense and difficult 
job in the dispatch office. Quoting from the Respond-
ent's Brief on Page 9: 
"It seems ironic that the Appellant argued 
differently when the evidence shows that she 
trained policemen from their jobs as dispatchers 
and had the most intense and difficult ;ob in the 
dispatch off ice when she was working with her 
male co-workers." (Emphasis added) 
This, together with the findings of the Industrial Com-
mission that there was testimony that Mrs. Kopp han-
dled the more complicated and more intense part of the 
job, would indicate that everyone is accepting the fact 
that there were two distinct functions. It is no matter 
that a person may have, "more intense and difficult 
task" than another but in order for discrimination to 
occur, a person must be on the same job. For the fore-
going reasons, it is the conclusions and legal inferences 
which are being attacked by Appellant and not a re-
arguing of the facts. The Appellant has during the 
total proceedings of this matter admitted the fact that 
the Respondent performed the same functions and 
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duties of her male counterparts. However, the argument 
continually was and still is that she did not perform 
these functions to the same extent as did the male count-
erparts. For testimony to this effect, Appellant would 
refer the Court to the Defendant's Memorandum before 
the Industrial Commission as well as testimony before 
the lower court. 
The testimony of Officer Floylynn Baker substan-
tiates the Appellant's contention that there were sepa-
rate primary functions. Officer Baker was a witness 
for the Respondent in the hearing before the Industrial 
Commission and was called again as witness in the lower 
court, but was not called as a witness for the Defendant 
as was indicated by the transcript. Mr. Baker was merely 
examined to supplement the record. His testimony was 
that he worked with the Defendant for about seven 
years, then continued as follows: 
"Q. During the time you have worked with Mrs. 
Kopp what was your designated function? 
A. Well, my designated function was a dis-
patcher, to perform all the functions necessary 
in the dispatch office. Primarily I answered the 
telephone when I wasn't on the radio. 
Q. Primarily you answered the telephone? Does 
that mean primarily Mrs. Kopp operated the 
radio? 
A. Yes, the ma,jority of the time. 
Q. . . . Could you give us an idea of any per-
centage of the time that Mrs. Kopp performed 
the same functions that you did on the telephone? 
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That is, give us a breakdown between the answer-
ing that Mrs. Kopp did on the telephone and the 
answering of the tele£hone you did? 
A. Percentagewise it would be awfully hard to 
do so because of the type of work there, and the 
volume of business. But I think a fair evaluation 
would be probably 20-80 percent. 
Q. Twenty percent of the time Mrs. Kopp an-
swered the telephone, and eighty percent of the 
time you answered the telephone, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As to the radio, could you give us a breakdown 
on t;he radio? 
A. Well, it would be almost reversed during my 
time in there. 
Q. Then you spent about twenty percent of your 
time on the radio and Mrs. Kopp eighty percent 
of the time on the radio? 
A. I would say that would be a fair evaluation. 
Q. Now, when Mrs. Kopp went to lunch, did you 
replace her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who would take over the operation of the 
radio at that time? 
A. I would. 
Q. When you went to lunch did Mrs. Kopp re-
place you? 
A. Not necessarily. It would depend on how 
many people were in the off ice, and in the event 
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that ~hey brought a clerk in she would probably 
help m answering the phones then, and, of course, 
I wasn't there, so I don't know. 
Q. The 80-20 split that you referred to, would 
that be a part of the time you operated the radio 
when Mrs. Kopp went to lunch'{ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you answer the radio when Mrs. Kopp 
was in the office? 
A. Not very often, no." (Emphasis added) 
(Transcript of District Court Pages .31 and 32) 
If for any reason it were interpreted that the deci-
sion of the Industrial Commission as well as the lower 
court was that Respondent performed the same job 
and performed such jo~ to an equal extent with her 
male counterparts, then Appellant would assert that 
these findings of fact were not based upon substantial 
and creditable evidence. 
POINT II 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IV. 
While it is true, as Respondent urges, that consti-
tutional objections, to be available for review on appeal, 
must ordinarily be first asserted in the lower court, how· 
ever, there are generally accepted exceptions to this 
rule. Among these exceptions are two which are relevant 
to this matter-one is when the issue raised is a matter 
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of public policy or concern and the other is where the 
question of the constitutionality involved is one of 
jurisdiction of the subject matter. See 4 C.J.S., Section 
234, Page 703. The question of whether or not to review 
the constitutionality is one of administration and not 
one of power of the court 
"No question of the power of this court is i11-
volved. Whether this court should review a 
question raised here for the first time depends 
upon the facts and circumstances disclosed bv 
the particular record. It undoubtedly has th
0
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power, but ordinarjly will not exercise it. The 
question is one of administration, not of power." 
Town of South Tucson v. Board of Sup'rs., 84 
P.2d 581, 584 (1938). 
In that case the question was whether or not the dis-
incorporation statute was constitutional and the court 
considered such question of considerable importance 
to the state as a matter of public policy. They said 
that other municipalities have been disincorporated in 
the past and more may desire disincorporation in the 
future; because of this the court said that the consti-
tutionality of the statute was one of great public concern 
and could first be considered on appeal even though 
such was not questioned in the lower court. The court 
further said: 
"One of the exceptions to the rule is questions 
of a general public nature, affecting the interests 
of the state at large, and this is particularly true 
when the question raised for the first time is 
one of substantive law which is not affected by 
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any dispute as to the facts of the case, for under 
such circumstances the parties may present the 
issue as thoroughly in the appellate court as it 
could have been presented below, without injury 
to either one." Town of South Tucson v. Board 
of Sup'rs., Supra. 
The statute here involved relates to discrimination 
in employment. It is a matter of daily and vital concern 
to the employees and the employers of the State. All 
are operating under it constantly. It is submitted that 
the interest of the public is sufficient to bring this matter 
within the exception of public policy and public concern. 
It may be observed that the Anti-Discrimination 
Division of the Industrial Commission is an administra-
tive body of limited jurisdiction. The Industrial Com-
mission has no jurisdiction with respect to hearings 
on matters of discrimination except as the Anti-Dis-
crimination Act, if constitutional, has conferred upon 
that body. The question raised by Appellant goes to 
the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission in regard 
back pay. If the Act is unconstitutional, the Industrial 
Commission is without jurisdiction; hence, the question 
is really a question of jurisdiction and, therefore, comes 
within the exception as a jurisdictional matter. For 
the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of the Act 
can and should be considered by this Court. 
POINT III 
FURTHER REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
POINT IV. 
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Respondent makes the claim that the factual matter 
regarding over-qualified police officers was determined 
against the Appellant in the lower court. There was 
no reference to any finding of fact regarding the quali-
fications of the male personnel who worked in the dis-
patch office. This is true in the findings of the Industrial 
Commission and of the lower court. 
Respondent further makes reference to the fact 
that not all males were police officers. This is found in 
Point II of Respondent's brief. There was only one 
male employee working in the dispatch off ice who was 
not a police officer. This. person was Harold Goates, 
and Mr. Goates was licensed by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission as a radio operator and in addition 
thereto was a qualified radio repairman able to maintain 
the radio equipment of the police department. Chief of 
Police Calvin C. Whitehead testified regarding this 
matter as follows: 
"Mr. Earl: 
Q. Referring to Mr. Goates, does he have a radio 
operator's license under the Federal Commu-
nications Commission? 
A. He has a first-class license. 
Q. Do you know how long he has had that li-
cense? 
A. A number of years. 
Q. He has been licensed then for a number of 
year? 
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A. I would say at least 15. 
Q. At least during the entire time he was work-
ing in the dispatch off ice, he has been licensed 
as such? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And could maintain equipment? 
A. Yes." 
* * * 
Commissioner Hadley: 
"Q. Do you know whether or not, when Mr. 
Goates was hired, his license as a radio operator 
was considered in his salary range? 
The Witness: 
A. Well, he was hired about 28 or 29 years ago. 
Commissioner Hadley: 
Q. I see. 
The Witness: 
A. And I don't know, but I'm sure it's been 
considered in the interim." (Industrial Record, 
page 219-221) 
Since Mr. Goates did have additional qualifications 
over and above those required to be a dispatcher, he 
would together with the police officers, be included 
within the category argued in Appellant's Brief as an 
over-qualified male personnel working as a dispatcher. 
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POINT IV 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT VI. 
Respondent would have this court believe that the 
right of action does not accrue until she was allowed to 
intervene and this just is not the case. The purpose of 
allowing a Complainant to intervene is for the purpose 
of presenting testimony at the hearing as set forth in 
Paragraph 8 of Section 34-35-7, U. C. A., 1953, as 
amended: 
"A Complainant may be allowed to intervene 
and present testimony in person or by counsel.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
Further, the regulations adopted by the Utah Industrial 
Commission state: 
"At the discretion of the Hearing Examiner 
or Commission, Complainant shall be permitted 
to intervene either in person or by counsel to 
present oral testimony or other evidence and to 
examine and cross-examine witnesses." (Adopted 
Regulations, Utah Industrial Commission, Regu-
lation 1, Section 7 (b), Hearing. 
The right of action which a person has who claims to 
be aggrieved by a discriminatory or alleged unfair 
employment practice is to file a complaint with the Com-
mission as is indicated in Section 34-35-7, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended, which provides in part as follows: 
"Any person claimed to be aggravated by tt 
discriminatory or alleged unfair employment 
practice may, by himself or his attorney at law, 
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make, sign, and file with the Commission a writ-
ten complaint in duplicate ... " 
Hence, there is no contingency specified in the Anti-
Discrimination Act before a cause of action accrues. 
A cause of action is a claim which may be enforced. 
It is the right which a party has to institute and carry 
through an action. Lewis v. Hyams, 63 P. 126, 26 Nev. 
68. The method of enforcing the claim and right which 
the Respondent was alleged to have was by filing the 
complaint with the Industrial Commission. For this 
reason there is no contingency and no reason for tolling 
the statute of limitation. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Appellant urges this Court to over-
turn the decision of the lower court. In the event the 
decision were to be upheld, it would mean that any 
time a person performs tasks that are performed by 
a higher employed person that person must be paid 
the same. This would be true whether these tasks are 
performed only during a small percentage of the time 
or for almost all of the working day. Such a decision 
would open the flood gates of litigation and bring cases 
into court which were not so intended by the Legis-
lature. The intent of the Legislature was that employees 
of different sexes be on the same footing and be treated 
equal by employers, not that one be given preference 
over the other by not performing the same job the same 
amount of time, but being entitled to the same pay. 
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If discrimination is found, it is urged that this is 
not a case where back-pay should be awarded. The ulti-
mate purpose of the Anti-Discrimination Act is to 
eliminate discrimination and this was accomplished 
without the award of back-pay. All reasons set forth 
by Appellant as to why back-pay should not be awarded 
are proper to be considered by this court and it is 
urged that it do so. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
City Attorney 
0. WALLACE EARL 
Assistant City Attorney 
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